“Searching for Constitutional Meaning in InstitutionalDesign: The Debate Over Judicial Appointments in the United Kingdom,” by Northwestern
University Law Professor Erin F. Delaney.
The abstract:
The United Kingdom is undergoing a period of dramatic
constitutional change. A spate of reforms ushered in by the Blair government at
the turn of the twenty-first century challenged conventional notions of British
governance and constitutional structure. In the shadow of these changes, one
new and bedeviling institutional task is to reconcile an independent judicial
branch, growing in power, with a system of parliamentary sovereignty. This
article will analyze the debate over judicial appointments in order to shed
light on the position of the modern British judiciary, and the new U.K. Supreme
Court in particular, within the British constitutional system. Questions of
institutional design expose deep divisions over the perceived extent of
judicial power, the relationship of the judiciary to Parliament, and the
constitutional justifications for diversity on the bench. Although a weak
consensus was achieved in the Crime & Courts Act 2013, stability in the
appointments regime is likely temporary. The contested nature of the modern
British constitutional system will ensure ongoing debate.
In Britain, Delaney writes, "safeguards protecting judges’ impartiality were developed in parallel with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, so that an 'independent judiciary' was understood as
comprising independent individual judges, rather than seen as a separate and independent
branch. (Indeed, the highest judicial body was a committee of the upper house of
parliament, and the Lord Chancellor, empowered to appoint judges, was at once head of the
judiciary, a member of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet, and the presiding officer of the House
of Lords.)"
comprising independent individual judges, rather than seen as a separate and independent
branch. (Indeed, the highest judicial body was a committee of the upper house of
parliament, and the Lord Chancellor, empowered to appoint judges, was at once head of the
judiciary, a member of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet, and the presiding officer of the House
of Lords.)"
Delaney writes “the Constitutional Reform Act (2005) [CRA] was heralded
as a ‘milestone’ in the separation of powers and a ‘major step forward’ in
judicial independence. It included three major changes. First, it created the
UK Supreme Court, which, in its own building on Parliament Square, provided a physical
demonstration of the new separation between the legislative and judicial
branches. To ensure stability, the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary—the Law
Lords—were retitled as the initial twelve Supreme Court Justices. Second, the
Act dramatically altered the role of the Lord Chancellor, removing his
legislative and judicial duties. And, finally, the CRA included various new appointments mechanisms designed to cabin the
Executive’s discretion, including the creation of the Judicial Appointments Commission for
England and Wales and a selection commission for Supreme Court appointments.”
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