Lobbying by Judges and Courts

Article by Western Carolina University Professor Roger Hartley says:

While budgets are tight and the needs of adjudication come first, courts need to build capacity to effectively lobby, like other agencies and “model” courts in other states do. We know that state chief justices, state court administrators, and local presiding judges and court managers lobby. In prior work, I suggest that the selection and tenure of court leaders needs to be rethought in some states. Courts need to pay close attention to the political, advocacy, and management skills when selecting chief justices. Short tenure or rotation of court leaders is also a problem, as courts might lose important political capital and relationships built by effective court leaders over time.

Judicial Independence

The political science literature on judicial selection includes lots of data and various perspectives not sufficiently voiced among lawyers and in the general public.  A good example is this article by Scott E. Graves, National Center for State Courts, Robert M. Howard, Georgia State University, and Pamela C. Corley, Vanderbilt University.

It seems to provide further empirical support for the proposition that judicial independence is determined primarily by the length of a judge's term.  This proposition goes back at least as far the Federalist Papers in which Hamilton (quoted  this article) says "Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to [the courts'] necessary independence."